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Abstract 
Based on the field of aesthetics, for centuries philosophers and more recently scientists have 
been concerned with understanding the artistic experience focusing on emotional responses 
to the perception of artworks. By contrast, in the last decades, evolutionary biology has 
been concerned with explaining the artistic experience by focusing on the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying this experience. Up until now, the cognitive mechanisms that allow hu-
mans to experience objects and events as art remain largely unexplored and there is still no 
conventional use of terms for referring to the processes which may explain why the artistic 
experience is characteristically human and universal to human beings (Dis ⁠sa⁠na⁠yake, 1992, 
p. 24; Donald, 2006, p. 4). In this paper, I will first question whether it is productive to 
understand the artistic experience in terms of perception and emotion, and I will subse-
quently propose a possible alternative explanation to understand this experience. Drawing 
upon the work of Ellen Dissanayake (1992, 2000, 2015), Merlin Donald (2001, 2006, 
2013), Antonio Damasio (1994, 2000, 2003, 2010), Barend van Heusden (2004, 2009, 
2010), and Alejandra Wah (2014), I will argue that this experience is characterized by par-
ticular degrees of imagination and consciousness.  
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In December 2015, the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness at New York University 
organized a debate, involving Gabrielle Starr and Alva Noë, on the question “Can neuro-
science help us understand art?”1 In this debate, Starr and Noë discuss the artistic experi-
ence from the perspective of aesthetics and focus on the formal characteristics of specific 
institutional artworks. For instance, Noë refers to a poem of Walt Whitman and two sculp-
tures by Auguste Rodin and Constantin Brancusi whereas Starr mentions her research on 
poetical genres such as the sonnet and the haiku. I would like to join this debate drawing 
upon my presentation given in the international workshop KNEW 2015 Placing Art and 
Music in Nature in Kazimierz Dolny, Poland in November 2015, that is, one month before 
this debate took place.  
In this paper I question whether it is productive to think about art in terms of perception 
and emotion. To question this is important because up until now aesthetic accounts have 
not fully explained the artistic experience. I argue that the artistic experience is character-
ized by a specific human cognitive strategy that combines particular degrees of imagina-
tion and consciousness, which I refer to as reflective imagination (Wah, 2014). This 
cognitive strategy can be triggered by the experience of not only institutional artworks but 
any emotionally competent stimulus whether recalled, perceived, or imagined (Damasio, 
2010, pp. 143, 149; Kandel, 2012, p. 313). To conclude, I also offer an answer to the 
debate’s main question. The purpose of this paper is to provide a possible alternative ex-
planation to understand the artistic experience based upon the work of Ellen Dissanayake 
(1992, 2000, 2015), Merlin Donald (2001, 2006, 2013), Antonio Damasio (1994, 2000, 
2003, 2010), Barend van Heusden (2004, 2009, 2010), and Alejandra Wah (2014).  
 
Perception and Emotion  
Based upon the philosophical field of aesthetics, scientists have aimed at explaining the 
artistic experience focusing on responses to the perception of formal features of objects 
and events in what is now referred to as empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics. At the 
end of the nineteenth-century, the physicist and philosopher Gustav Fechner (1860, 1876), 
a pioneer of empirical aesthetics and founder of psychophysics, investigated the relation-
ship between stimuli and perception, and developed methods to quantify sensations. He 
argued that our sensations are related to physical properties and investigated how features 
of stimuli such as color, shape, size, proportion, brightness and loudness affect human 
preferences and please them. In the first half of the twentieth-century, Gestalt psycholo-
gists argued further that examining the perception of specific features made the process of 
perception seem too passive. They postulated that we perceive the world as a whole, and 
they analyzed principles such as proximity, similarity, closure, and continuation. The Ge-
stalt approach to perception as applied to art reached its peak in the second half of the 
                                                          
1 https://wp.nyu.edu/consciousness/neuroaesthetics/ 
Cognitive Processes Underlying the Artistic Experience 
47 
twentieth-century with studies conducted by psychologist Rudolph Arnheim (1954, 1969) 
who pointed out other formal principles that influence perception such as balance, sym-
metry, and composition (Chatterjee, 2013, pp. 134–136). 
The next major trend in empirical aesthetics was a move from perception towards the role 
of emotion and attention. Daniel Berlyne (1960), for instance, studied the role of arousal 
and motivational factors focusing on pleasure, and thought of properties not considered 
by the Gestalt psychologists such as novelty, surprise, complexity, and ambiguity. Several 
decades later, and drawing upon the term “neuroaesthetics” coined by Semir Zeki (1999), 
neuroscientists studied neural underpinnings mediating the perception of judged-beautiful 
and judged-ugly institutional art basing their research upon neuroimaging methods such 
as a noninvasive tool sensitive to the location of brain activity (fMRI), a technology which 
records the duration of brain waves and electrical pulses (MEG), and a method which 
detects electrical activity in sensorimotor areas, core emotional centers, and reward-related 
centers (EEG). For example, Kawabata and Zeki asked participants to rate abstract, still-
life, landscape, or portrait paintings as beautiful, neutral, or ugly while their brains were 
being scanned. They found that activity was greater in the orbitofrontal cortex for stimuli 
judged as beautiful, and in the motor cortex for stimuli judged as ugly (Kawabata & Zeki, 
2004). Neuroscientists Vilayanur Ramachandran and William Hirstein also related formal 
principles to what they referred to as art and proposed “eight laws of aesthetic experience.” 
These are peak shift effect, grouping and binding, isolating a single module and allocating 
attention, reinforcing contrast extraction, perceptual problem solving, abhorrence of 
unique vantage points, symmetry, and metaphors. They argued that these principles excite 
the organism optimally, as supernormal stimuli, triggering a high emotional activation 
which may be partially pre-established in the organism, powerfully stimulating neural 
mechanisms which mediate perception, and thus functioning as early-warning systems 
that arrest attention and facilitate the activation of neural patterns vital for survival (Ra-
machandran & Hirstein, 1999, pp. 15, 32). 
By the end of the twentieth-century, neuroaesthetics had firmly established that the percep-
tion of certain formal features of stimuli, mostly of institutional art, may be measured in 
quantifiable parameters—even if one is not fully aware of those parameters—and that neu-
ral patterns underpin emotional responses. However, in the last decade, at least three argu-
ments have been put forward to support the statement that these studies cannot fully explain 
the artistic experience. First, the neuroimaging techniques and technologies used in these 
experiments lie at the heart of some of the most pressing and persistent problems in under-
standing the artistic experience. The manner by which these studies compose and decom-
pose the possible structural aspects of experience has important limitations (Noë, 2009, 
pp. 20–21; Stafford, 2011, p. 5). For instance, the neuroimaging techniques used in the afore-
mentioned studies do not even offer the possibility of recording activity in certain brain 
areas and lack a sufficient spatial and temporal resolution (Cela-Conde et al., 2011, p. 46).  
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Second, the concept of art is being conceived of in an extremely limited way. In principle, 
not every person is interested in engaging with institutional art, or with its theoretical dis-
cussions, norms, and conventions; and any emotionally competent object or event can po-
tentially afford an artistic experience, as I will explain in the last section. As John Hyman 
already pointed out when criticizing Ramachandran and Hirstein’s theory on the eight 
principles, these perceptual principles may indeed apply to institutional artworks, but they 
may also apply to any meaningful stimulus, any emotionally competent object or event 
that arrests attention (Hyman, 2010, pp. 248–251, 260). Empirical evidence consistently 
suggests that the emotional response to the perception of formal features of institutional 
artworks is not different from the emotional response to the perception of formal features 
of any object or event (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009, p. 686). Our organism appears to be pro-
grammed by evolution to respond emotionally to the perception of significant stimuli au-
tomatically and without any conscious awareness of the stimulus or conscious control of 
the responses (LeDoux, 1996, p. 267). We seem to be predisposed to respond with the 
activation of neural patterns associated with emotions when we encounter certain formal 
features. For instance, think of the automatic emotional responses to the perception of 
certain features of stimuli such as size (as in large animals), large span (as in flying eagles), 
type of motion (as in reptiles), certain sounds (as in growling), and certain configurations 
of the body state (as in the pain felt during a heart attack). All these formal features are 
processed and detected by the limbic system, whose neuron nuclei possess neural dispo-
sitions, and trigger the enactment of a body state characteristic of a certain emotion. To 
know what precisely is causing the pain, or to recognize consciously the bear, the snake, 
the eagle, or the heart as such is not necessary for an emotional response. The only re-
quirement is that the organism’s early sensory cortices detect and categorize the key fea-
ture or features of a given entity, and structures such as the amygdala receive signals 
concerning their presence (Damasio, 1994, p. 131).  
Other examples of such emotionally competent formal features are certain organizations 
of sounds in relation to timbres, pitches, and rhythms, specific kinds of shapes, spatial 
organizations, and landscapes. A well-known example of landscape-preference is the one 
that humans find intrinsically pleasurable, one that is similar to the savannas and wood-
lands of East Africa where hominids split off from chimpanzee lineages, which includes 
open vistas and proximity to water, vegetation, and evidence of animal and bird life (Dut-
ton, 2009, pp. 43–44). One may also think of the innate preferences for symmetrical faces 
as a sign of reproductive fitness, the innate ability to read facial expressions, the general 
tendency towards body adornment, or the general emotional reactions to certain textures, 
tastes, and smells (Wah, 2014, p. 66). These innate preferences, inclinations, or universal 
emotional reactions to the perception of certain formal stimuli in all likelihood have sur-
vival value and became established in the Pleistocene (Damasio, 2010, p. 295; Dutton, 
2009, p. 30). This means that to study the artistic experience, it appears necessary to con-
sider predetermined universal emotional responses to the perception of certain formal 
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fea⁠tures of stimuli in general, and not only of those of objects and events which are insti-
tutionally recognized as art. These universal emotional responses must be taken to consti-
tute a first level of meaning, or “universal meaning,” in the artistic experience.  
Third, their strict focus on beauty, pleasure, visual and auditory images, their search for 
general principles and neglect of individual aspects, and their disregard for contextual fea-
tures have also been criticized (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009, p. 54; Cela-Conde et al., 
2011, p. 46). The attempt to understand the artistic experience by focusing on beauty, 
pleasure, and visual and auditory images is certainly limiting. To come to grips with the 
artistic experience, it seems necessary to take into account other important mental states 
besides pleasure, other basic emotional responses which are not related to happiness and 
surprise such as fear, anger, disgust, and sadness, and other images apart from the visual 
and the auditory, such as gustatory, olfactory, and tactile images. Besides, even though the 
capacity to appreciate beauty seems to be universal, individuals do not always agree on 
which objects and events are beautiful—something which is closely tied to learnt meaning, 
which sometimes seems to be ignored in these studies. Here it may be useful to stress that 
even though attention is firstly motivated by innate preferences, it is also motivated by 
learnt preferences and goals acquired on the basis of the innate preferences (Damasio, 
1994, pp. 185, 198). Moreover, our senses engage memories and prior knowledge, and by 
means of an associative process, individuals learn to respond emotionally to many other 
stimuli (Damasio, 2001, pp. 67, 68). Objects and events have therefore different meanings 
for different individuals, in different contexts, and at different times (Cela-Conde et al., 
2011, p. 47). Emotionally competent objects and events acquire thus different meanings 
and perceptual values as individuals interact with them in terms of what they already 
know. These learnt emotional responses to the perception of certain formal features of 
objects and events must be taken to constitute a second level of meaning, or “individual 
meaning,” in the artistic experience. 
Be that as it may, the activation of emotional responses to the perception of certain formal 
features of both universal and learnt meaningful stimuli does not as such constitute an ar-
tistic experience. We cannot fully explain this experience by only studying perception and 
emotion. Even though Starr and Noë pointed out this fact in the debate, they did not seem 
to come up with an alternative solution. Nonetheless, evolutionary biology, including the 
embodied and the embedded premises, can begin explaining the artistic experience by shed-
ding light on the cognitive processes underlying it. Pointing out such processes can help us 
explain why the artistic experience is highly individual, yet universal to human beings, an 
experience that changes in intensity and varies in duration, as Starr mentions (2013, p. 18), 
and that certainly includes emotional responses to the perception of universal and learnt 
meaningful objects and events, as argued above, but that is characterized not by perception 





Imagination and Consciousness  
Rather than perception and emotion, two cognitive capacities that distinguish humans 
from other species are particular degrees of imagination and consciousness, and these 
seem to make possible, and underlie, the artistic experience (van Heusden, 2010, p. 159; 
Wah, 2014, pp. 119–124).  
Degrees of imagination, the power of forming, retaining, and manipulating mental images, 
no matter of how rudimentary a kind, provided that the mental images imply some dim 
idea of an absent object or event, can be distinguished in the animal kingdom. For instance, 
mollusca, insecta, arachnida, crustacea, cephalopoda such as octopuses or squids, and 
cold-blooded vertebrata such as fish or reptiles can recall sensuous associations and retain 
the memory of a sensation when there is no direct perception of objects and events. Hy-
menoptera such as ants, bees or wasps, and wild animals such as foxes, wolves, or rabbits 
can form mental images of absent objects and events suggested by other objects and 
events. Birds such as eagles, parrots, or canaries, and mammalia such as elephants, horses, 
dogs, cats, or apes can form mental images of absent objects and events independently of 
any obvious suggestion proven in their dreaming. Forming, retaining, and manipulating 
mental images intentionally with the set purpose of obtaining new combinations is distinc-
tively human (Romanes, 1885, pp. 142–153). This possibility to recreate or manipulate 
mental patterns requires a distinctive degree of consciousness.  
In the last two decades, neuroscientific approaches to consciousness have advocated that 
the biological foundations of conscious experience involve coordinated and synchronized 
firing between neural patterns belonging to several different and often distant areas in the 
nervous system (Cela-Conde et al., 2011, p. 41). Consciousness, a physical, private, neural 
process which influences behavior and involves large populations of neurons engaged in 
strong and rapid “reentrant” interactions widely distributed in many different regions of 
the nervous system is associated with biological structures that have evolved over time 
(Edelman & Tononi, 2000, pp. 36, 49, 62, 106). The brain stem, interconnected with the 
whole organism, seems to ground consciousness. Evidence of this has been found in lesion 
studies. When the upper part of the brain stem is damaged, the result is coma or vegetative 
state in which consciousness is impaired. By contrast, when the lower part of the brain 
stem is affected, the result is locked-in-syndrome, which consists of complete paralysis 
while consciousness is maintained (Damasio, 2011).  
Degrees of consciousness can also be distinguished in the animal kingdom. Gerald Edel-
man and Giulio Tononi distinguish between primary consciousness, the capacity to gen-
erate a mental scene for the purpose of directing behavior, and higher-order consciousness 
which presupposes the existence of primary consciousness, and is accompanied by a sense 
of self and the ability to construct and integrate past (memory) and future scenes (imagi-
nation) (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, pp. 102–104). Likewise, Antonio Damasio points at 
two similar levels of consciousness, but he refers to them in different terms. The first is 
the minimal-scope, essential or core consciousness, being the sense of the here-and-now 
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which revolves around the core self, and the second is extended consciousness which di-
rects the autobiographical self and coincides with identity. Degrees of self, or the feeling 
of one’s own existence, can also be distinguished. The nonconscious proto self which 
characterizes deep sleep, the core self which emerges in core consciousness, and the auto-
biographical self which is linked to the idea of identity and is based upon the experience 
of the integration of the here-and-now (perception), with the lived past (memory), and the 
anticipated future (imagination), so-called “mental time travel” (Damasio, 1999, pp. 17, 
174–175; 2003, pp. 177–179; 2010, pp. 168–172; 2011). To explain the origins of con-
sciousness it is important to underline that consciousness has a cumulative and conserva-
tive character and that it expands both in evolution and in development. Several degrees 
of consciousness can be distinguished in humans, from awareness of feelings to complex 
extended states. These levels emerge and develop during the first ten years of life, with 
implications for the development of the self and the social and cognitive functioning, and 
they seem to reflect its evolutionary trajectory (Nelson, [2005] 2012, pp. 116, 124–125). 
Even though a degree of self-consciousness—that is, self-recognition—has been demon-
strated in bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, elephants, dolphins, and birds 
(Plot⁠nik et al., 2015; de Waal, 2012), a distinctive degree of self-consciousness seems to 
characterize humans: self-imagination.  
Barend van Heusden explains that human cognition is characterized by the experience of 
difference between memory and perception, so-called “decoupled cognition.” The nega-
tive outcome of this experience is that doubts about what humans perceive, about mean-
ings, and about intentions make life a very uncertain affair. However, the positive outcome 
of this experience is that it liberates humans from the immediacy of perception and emo-
tion, making comparison, imagination, metaphor, and creative reasoning possible. For in-
stance, when one is reading a book, the perception of the text is backgrounded, while 
imagination is foregrounded. The experience of difference between memory and percep-
tion includes both the experience of difference in the environment and the experience of 
difference between one’s own here-and-now, lived past, and imagined future. Humans can 
deal with their own experience of difference via self-imagination, a human cognitive strat-
egy which implies the acting out or the recreation of one’s own or others’ situation in the 
imagination and underlies the artistic experience. Through self-imaginations humans are 
able to act out or recreate situations that are not identical to or dependent on the situations 
they actually perceive (van Heusden, 2004, pp. 8, 13–18, 24; 2009, pp. 615–622; 2010, 
pp. 160–161). Whether self-imagination is related to so-called “default mode network” 
mentioned in the debate by Starr is still to be researched (Buckner et al., 2008). The fact 
that self-imaginations build upon one’s own memories and perceptions explains why the 
artistic experience is highly individual.  
Merlin Donald proposes a model that can shed light on the origins of this experience. He 
points out three adaptations in human culture: the mimetic, the mythic and the theoretic. 
The first adaptation took place around 2 million years ago, and is based on the capacity for 
planning and the practice of skills through imitation and ritual. The second adaptation oc-
curred around 150,000 years ago, and led to a rapid expansion of culture through language. 
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The third adaptation came with so-called theoretic culture, began around 40,000 years ago, 
and is heavily dependent on media technologies. The progression of these adaptations is 
cumulative and conservative, which means that the chronology of this model lies in the 
internal logic of the evolutionary sequence rather than in specific dates. Donald stresses 
that whereas the first two transitions were dependent upon evolution—the first upon 
changes in the nervous system and the second upon changes in the vocal apparatus—the 
third transition was dependent upon the invention and elaboration of external storage de-
vices. According to this theory the first stage enabled mimesis, the foundation skill that 
defines human cognition and made the artistic experience possible. Behavioral manifesta-
tions such as imitation, rehearsal, and non-linguistic gesture are mimetic acts and are the 
result of the conscious control over action. Their cognitive core is kinematic imagination, 
that is, the ability to envision one’s own body in motion. Even though the cognitive quality 
that dominates in the experience of the arts is mimesis, the diversity of art today reflects the 
three cultural domains (Donald, 1991, pp. 269, 273; 2001, pp. 263, 271, 274; 2006, pp. xv, 
8–10; 2013). Archaeological evidence of the earliest degrees of this experience are to be 
found in 2.5 million year old carved stones, and in 1.5 million year old hand-axes from the 
early Pleistocene which already reflect degrees of imaginative power, rehearsal of skill, en-
hanced attention, flexibility of response, and self-awareness (Dutton, 2009; Donald, 2013). 
 
Artistic Experience  
As the study of the artistic experience from the perspective of evolutionary biology began 
only a couple of decades ago, there is still no conventional use of terms for referring to the 
cognitive processes underlying this experience. This cognitive strategy has been referred 
to as “aesthetic imagination” (Dissanayake, 2001), “kinematic imagination” (Donald, 
2001), “creative imagination” (Damasio, 2003; Mithen, 2005) “imaginative experience” 
(Dutton, 2009), “artistic cognition” (Sullivan, 2010) and “self-imagination” (van Heusden, 
2010). I will refer to this cognitive process as “reflective imagination” (Wah, 2014) be-
cause the use of this term emphasizes the degrees of imagination and consciousness nec-
essary for this process to take place, and because it facilitates the distinction between this 
cognitive strategy and the objects and events that may be experienced—and which are 
commonly referred to as “art,” “artworks,” or “the arts” (Wah, 2014, p. 118). 
The artistic experience, be it through making music, singing, dancing, or telling a story by 
means of pantomime, drawing, pretend play, spoken or written language, is underlain by 
reflective imagination. This experience derives from self-observation, and as such, it im-
proves the understanding of emotional and social cues, giving the opportunity to explore 
and try out a variety of emotions and situations. Once one becomes aware of the relation 
objects and situations have with emotions, one can strive to regulate or control emotional 
responses, at least to some extent, because one can decide which objects and situations 
one allows in the environment, and on which objects and situations one lavishes time and 
attention (Damasio, 2003, pp. 51–52; Dutton, 2009, pp. 106, 122–123; Dutton in Kandel, 
2012, pp. 441–443; Kandel, 2012, p. 390). As the artistic experience allows humans to 
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recreate events, consider indirect evidence, deduce “what might have been” or “what 
might come to be,” and work out solutions to problems without the actual practice, we 
may refer to these experiences as self-rehearsals. These are a means to rehearse specific 
aspects of life, to exercise emotion, empathy, theory of mind or mind reading, that is, to 
read one’s own and others beliefs, desires or intentions, and therefore to solve problems 
in the imaginary realm. For instance, the experience of storytelling is a low-risk way of 
dealing with one’s own or others’ situations in the imagination (Boyd, 2009; Damasio, 
2010, p. 296; Dutton, 2009, pp. 106, 113; Gombrich, 1987, p. 211 in Kandel, 2012, p. 13; 
Kandel, 2012, pp. 393, 442). This self-reflective process is an “organism–environment” 
adaptation that confers the ability to escape from being stimulus bound, to foresee and 
evaluate beforehand, to take another’s viewpoint, to reflect upon one’s own behaviors and 
actions and their outcomes, and to change those behaviors and actions (Metcalfe, 2008). 
A basic function of the artistic experience is to manage life. Humans can deal with the 
unfamiliar and anticipate reactions through this process of understanding, of signification, 
of identity construction, both personal and collective, which is reflected upon with ges-
tures, sounds, artefacts, language, diagrams, and structures (van Heusden, 2009, p. 611; 
2010, pp. 160–161). Identity constructions are important because they provide orientation 
and guide behavior and action (Damasio, 2003, p. 208). This is possible because, even 
though the majority of one’s behaviors are nonconscious, feelings are important contribu-
tors to behavioral tendencies. Emotional systems coordinate many behavioral processes, 
but when aroused, those systems are accompanied by feeling states that guide and sustain 
patterns of behavior and may mediate learning. Because of this, for at least some time, 
experiences control behaviors (Panksepp, 1998, pp. 9, 15–16). The frontal regions of the 
central nervous system are concerned with the motor control of behavior and action, which 
improves self-regulation, and with the ability to perceive oneself as actor, to rehearse, 
reflect, and shape one’s actions creatively, generating novel neural patterns. The fact that 
the artistic experience arrests attention and generates novel neural patterns enables flexi-
bility of response and a wide range of behavior (Donald, 2006, pp. 2–11, 16–20). By doing 
so, the artistic experience complexifies consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, pp. 63–64; 
Nelson, 2005). Based upon the innate propensities for mutuality and the feeling of belong-
ing to a group, at its highest degree the artistic experience is characterized by a fleeting 
loss of self, providing the opportunity to enlarge the individual’s sense of being (Disanna-
yake, 2000, pp. 49, 203). Far from being peripheral, dysfunctional, or trivial, the artistic 
experience is distinctively human and overwhelmingly integral to humankind (Dis-
sanayake, 1992, pp. xvi, xix; Damasio, 2010, p. 294). 
Many scientists and humanists understand the artistic experience as entertainment, which 
is an obstacle that still needs overcoming (Stafford, 2011, p. 5). Yet the artistic experience 
is not about entertainment, but about self-engagement. The difference between entertain-
ment and the artistic experience is that the former does not imply reflective imagination; 
that is, one perceives a situation but one does not imagine oneself or others in such situa-
tion. From the perspective of this paper it is therefore difficult to give specific or concrete 
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examples of “artworks” as the experience of any meaningful object or event, any emotion-
ally competent stimulus, may trigger this cognitive process (Wah, 2014, pp. 132–133). For 
instance, think of how sometimes while experiencing a certain film, one may feel as if one 
were playing the role of a character. After this experience takes place, one may feel the 
urge to act, to take action, or to change a behavior (Wah, 2014, p. 137). As long as one 
recognizes oneself or others in such a situation, the experience of any emotionally com-
petent stimulus, whether recalled, perceived, or imagined, can trigger this reflective aspect 
of the imagination. This is possible because memory, perception, and imagination ulti-
mately recruit some of the same neural circuitry (Kandel, 2012, p. 313). 
In neural terms, the difference between human memory, perception, and imagination is that 
memory is the capacity for strengthening the connection between neurons, perception is the 
capacity for mapping patterns of sensorimotor activity, and imagination is the capacity for 
retaining, forming, and manipulating these mental patterns (Wah, 2014). Lesion studies and 
functional imaging suggest that the recall of objects and events depends on the sites en-
gaged in the original perception of these objects and events. The location where memory 
records are (re)experienced is not that different from the location of the original percep-
tions (Damasio, 2010, pp. 143, 149). Memory has properties that allow perception to alter 
recall and recall to alter perception. Every act of perception is, to some degree, an act of 
creation, and every act of memory is, to some degree, an act of imagination (Edelman & 
Tononi, 2000, p. 101). Humans can reliably map states that are actually occurring, but they 
can also transform body states by recalling, and simulate body states that have not yet oc-
curred by imagining them. Whether they are actually mapped in perception, reconstructed 
maps recalled from memory, or simulated maps from the imagination, the effect is similar; 
but the emotional grade or intensity varies. While some stimuli trigger weak, barely per-
ceptible emotional reactions, others evoke strong emotional reactions. Pattern activation is 
not set, because a number of influences can modulate the activity. Recalling and imagining 
are therefore approximations rather than replicas, and thus not quite as vivid or accurate as 
actual perception (Damasio, 2003, pp. 55–59; 2010, pp. 70, 93, 111, 149). This means that 
the artistic experience may be triggered by the experience of any emotionally competent 
stimulus, whether recalled, perceived, or imagined; however, the intensity of this experi-
ence increases with the actual perception of meaningful objects and events. This explains 
why the perception of meaningful institutional artworks, which presupposes voluntary at-
tention, may facilitate the triggering of an artistic experience.  
To be sure, stimuli that are too short, too weak, or too strong, may be perceived in core 
consciousness and may lead to an emotional response. These stimuli may be sufficient for 
sensory detection, produce enough neural activation, and may eventually be retrieved or 
recognized in extended consciousness. However, if the activation has no highly differenti-
ated patterns, extended conscious experience does not occur. This means that there is a 
correlation between sustained neural activity and grades of consciousness (Edelman & 
To⁠noni, 2000, pp. 67–70). Thus, at the level of minimal attention and core consciousness 
the attention is outward-directed, and humans interact with objects and events in terms of 
what they already know, in terms of memories. In such cases, emotional responses to the 
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perception of formal features of both universal and learnt meaningful objects and events 
are stereotyped or predisposed. By contrast, at the level of enhanced attention and extended 
consciousness the attention becomes inward-directed, and humans can experience objects 
and events in terms of self-imaginations. In such cases, responses to the experiences are felt 
and become flexible (Donald, 2006, p. 5; Wah, 2014, p. 121). This is important for our 
purposes because the latter is the process which underlies the artistic experience.  
From the perspective of this paper, on the one hand, making a distinction between artists 
and beholders is not necessary, as the experience of reflective imagination is not the ex-
clusive preserve of exceptionally creative individuals, but is equally at work in the mind 
of any self-engaged beholder (Currie in Roth, 2007, p. xxxiii). It is because of this that the 
discrete roles of artist and beholder are sometimes not considered outside the Western 
tradition (Cross, 2007, p. 146). From the point of view of this paper, on the other hand, 
Starr’s proposal to “unify the arts” as a category, that is, to posit a kinship of the arts, 
becomes a possibility (Starr, 2013, p. 3). This unification would include the arts of all 
kinds, in all times and places, including the evolutionary past, making possible the explo-
ration of their universality and probable adaptive value (Dissanayake, 2015). With this 
form of self-reflection, and via imagination, humans can reflect upon themselves, upon 
others, and upon the environment (van Heusden in Schaik, 2010). This explains why “art 
unveils us to ourselves,” the quote mentioned by Noë in the debate with the only purpose 
of dazzling his audience, as he himself stated. The purpose of this paper is, however, to 
contribute to an explanation of why the artistic experience affords to do so by pointing out 
the cognitive processes underlying this experience.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that, in contrast to what Starr and Noë discussed in the debate 
“Can neuroscience help us understand art?”, aesthetics is not what characterizes the artistic 
experience. The cognitive processes which underlie the artistic dimension of an experience 
are not perception and emotion, as often stated, but particular degrees of imagination and 
consciousness. I refer to this cognitive strategy as reflective imagination (Wah, 2014), a 
strategy which may be triggered by the experience of not only institutional art but any 
emotionally competent stimulus, whether recalled, perceived, or imagined. The fact that 
distinctive degrees of imagination and consciousness underlie the artistic experience ex-
plains why this experience is characteristically human and universal to human beings. The 
fact that self-imaginations build upon one’s own memories and perceptions explains why 
this experience is highly individual.  
Finally, to answer the debate’s main question, I consider that neuroscience can certainly 
help us understand art, for it reveals conscious and unconscious cognitive functions and 
sheds light on the biology of attention, memory, emotion, perception, imagination, and 
consciousness. The primary aim is, however, not to quantify emotional responses to the 
perception of specific examples of institutional artworks, find their neural correlates, or 
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visualize them on the basis of neuroimaging techniques. As experiences are embodied and 
embedded, they do not have clear temporal boundaries, and can hardly be translated into 
data points. By contrast, the primary aim of studying the artistic experience, I suggest, is 
to investigate the cognitive processes underlying it in order to understand its basic func-
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